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EFFECTIVE USE OF INFORMANTS
AND ACCOMPLICE WITNESSES
ANN C. ROWLAND*

I.

OVERVIEW

Informants are undisclosed persons who confidentially provide material
information to the Government about criminal activity.' They may or may not
be involved in the criminal activity. Rarely are informants public-spirited
citizens who volunteer solely because they have information that might be
useful. Informants usually receive some compensation or benefit for their
information in the form of a reward, regular monetary payments, reimbursement for expenses, or other benefit. Some informants agree to testify at trial,
others do not. In this Article, "informant" means any person who receives or
expects to receive some compensation, monetary or otherwise, in return for
testimony.
Similarly, accomplice witnesses are just that-participants in the criminal
activity who agree to cooperate in the investigation and testify against other
participants.2 Usually, accomplice witnesses agree to "help" the Government
in return for some consideration in charging or at sentencing or, sometimes, for
immunity from prosecution. Witnesses involved in illegal activity can
effectively provide the jury with an insider's view of a conspiracy or joint
criminal venture. The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient
to support a conviction under federal law.3
However, it is the rare case that can be prosecuted successfully without
substantial corroboration of the criminal witness. Defense attorneys routinely
mount effective attacks on the motivations of accomplices and informants to
testify falsely. These motivations include a reduction in sentence, immunity
from prosecution, financial rewards, revenge, and elimination of the
competition in criminal activity. The low esteem in which these witnesses are
held is highlighted by a standard instruction a jury receives when an informer
testifies:
The use of paid informants is common and permissible.

* Assistant United States Attorney, Northern District of Ohio. The author thanks
paralegal Wendy Leonard, Northern District of Ohio, for her research assistance on this Article,
and John L. Carlton, a partner at Arnold and Porter in Los Angeles and a former Assistant U.S.
Attorney, Central District of California, who participated in writing an earlier version of this
Article.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 780 (6th ed. 1990).
2. Id. at 17.
3. E.g., United States v. Latouf, 132 F.3d 320,332 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 1572 (1998).
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But you should consider [such a witness's] testimony with
more caution than the testimony of other witnesses. Consider
whether his testimony may have been influenced by what the
government gave him.
* . * Do not convict the defendant based on the
unsupported testimony of such a witness, standing alone,
unless you believe his testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.4
If government agents and prosecutors are not vigilant, the misconduct of their
witnesses can taint the entire prosecution.To avoid pitfalls, prosecutors should follow four basic rules in using criminal
witnesses:
(1) Corroborate the witness;
(2) Obtain a proffer before granting immunity or entering into a plea
agreement;
(3) If the witness will be pleading guilty, make sure that the plea
agreement is reasonable; and
(4) Expect the worst from the witness.
II. SELECTING THE COOPERATING WITNESS AND OBTAINING A PROFFER
Before approaching a co-conspirator or an accomplice, the Government
must have sufficient leverage to induce cooperation; that is, the Government
must be able to convince the potential cooperator that he is facing certain
conviction, and that the sentence can be mitigated only through cooperation.
Target the right individual to approach for cooperation. The primary
consideration should be the level of involvement in the offense. It is better to
use a "little fish" to catch a "big fish" than the reverse. In other words, the
4. 1 EDWARD J. DEVITr ET AL.,

FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL

AND CRIMINAL § 15.02, at 480 (4th ed. 1992) (pattern jury instruction for Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals).
5. See United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239,241-45 (7th Cir. 1995) (addressing issues
raised because of unprofessionally close relationship between government prosecutors and
criminal witnesses and granting new trial); United States v. Edenfield, 995 F.2d 197, 201 (11 th
Cir. 1993) (holding that under "totality of the circumstances," government acts of entering into
contingent fee arrangement with confidential informant, selecting targets of investigation, and
involving informant as agent of government in planning and executing drug crimes with which
defendants were charged were not so outrageous as to violate the defendants' due process
rights); United States v. Olson, 978 F.2d 1472, 1481-83 (7th Cir. 1992) (exonerating agents of
outrageous misconduct as most alleged acts of misconduct, including facilitating informant
reentry into the United States and housing the informant prior to approval, amounted to
administrative errors and finding the use ofcontingent fee arrangement to pay informant did not
prejudice defendant); United States v. Barrera-Moreno, 951 F.2d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1991)
(refusing to dismiss drug indictments based on government's conduct in permitting defendants'
use and distribution of cocaine and not monitoring informants' drug use); United States v.
Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1470 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding agents not obligated to discontinue using
an informant using heroin and engaging in prostitution during investigation of defendant).
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prosecutor should first try to obtain cooperation from those who are minimally
culpable and then ascend through the hierarchy of the criminal enterprise.
Once a problem witness has agreed to cooperate, a proffer should be
obtained. This allows the Government an opportunity to assess the nature and
the quality of the testimony before committing to a particular plea agreement
or to immunity. The proffer session also serves as an opportunity to learn
whether the witness has a relationship with any other law enforcement entity
through which implied or express promises of leniency or favored treatment
may have been made.
Solicit a proffer session by sending a letter to the witness's lawyer setting
forth the terms of the proffer. Generally, the basic terms of a proffer agreement
are as follows: (1) the witness must tell the truth and not make material
omissions; (2) statements made during the proffer cannot be used against the
witness in the Government's case in chief; (3) statements made during the
proffer can be used to impeach the witness at trial and at sentencing if the
witness provides information that is contrary to, or inconsistent with,
statements made during the proffer; (4) the Government may use the leads and
fruits of the interview against the witness;6 (5) the proffer itself will not be
considered "substantial assistance" for purposes of section 5K1.1 of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines7 (this term may not always apply); and (6) any
limitations on the use of statements made at the proffer are void if the witness
lies.
It is best to obtain the proffer directly from the witness as opposed to
taking it from the attorney for the witness. If at all possible, the prosecutor
should attend the proffer interview so that she can make an independent
assessment of credibility. A complete record of the interview in the form of a
memo should be made so that allegations of recent fabrication on crossexamination can be rebutted.8
During the negotiations and the proffer, the Government should reveal as
little as possible about the investigation to the witness and defense counsel.
This can be difficult because the Government must disclose enough of its case
to convince the witness to plead guilty and cooperate. But if too much is
revealed, the defense will seek to demonstrate that the witness has fabricated
evidence to tell the Government what it wanted to hear. In any event, it is a
good idea to make a record of what the Government tells the witness during the
proffer so that an allegation of recent fabrication can be rebutted.9 For the same
reason, witnesses should be isolated from each other whenever possible to

6. See United States v. Claiborne, 62 F.3d 897, 901 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Maldonado, 38 F.3d 936,942(7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Rowley, 975 F.2d 1357, 1361-62
(8th Cir. 1992).
7. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl, at 356

(1998).
8. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B).
9. Id.
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rebut allegations that witnesses jointly fabricated their testimony.
During the proffer the Government should attempt to elicit details from the
witness that can be corroborated with telephone records, hotel records, bank
records, and other documents. Finalizing the plea agreement should be delayed
until these details are corroborated and a determination of the witness's
credibility has been made.
Whenever the prosecutor meets with a cooperating witness or informant,
whether it be for a proffer or trial preparation, a law enforcement agent should
be present to act as a witness, to memorialize the substance of the witness's
statements, and to shield the prosecutor from being called in as a witness.
Likewise, secretaries and paralegals should have no unsupervised contact with
such witnesses.
III. PAYMENTS TO WITNESSES
Paying an informer or cooperating witness is often unavoidable. These
payments may take the form of regular, interval-type payments or of a bonus
at the completion of the case. An informant who has been promised a
contingent fee by the Government is not per se disqualified from testifying."0
However, these arrangements should be pursued with caution because large
financial rewards for successful prosecutions diminish an informant's
credibility.
When authorizing witness payments, a prosecutor should try to
characterize the proposed payment of a bonus as a "possibility," keeping the
amount indefinite so that the witness can testify that she does not know the
amount or even if the Government will pay her. If money is paid prior to
testimony, the prosecutor should attempt to tie the payments to the cooperative
actions of the witness and to the value of the legitimate income that she is sacrificing to gather information for the Government. This, of course, is difficult to
do when the witness does not have legitimate income.
In any agreement, insert a provision setting aside money for taxes, support
payments, and payments on civil judgments. This insertion will insure that the
Government will not appear to have assisted the witnesses in avoiding these
obligations. Even when financial incentives are so coercive as to be considered
contingent fees, the properly instructed jury is the sole arbiter of the impact of
such fees on the credibility of the witness."
If the investigation is still covert, explore consensual monitoring
opportunities and other undercover investigations as these may provide
excellent corroboration for a witness with credibility problems. Consensual
monitoring can, however, end the investigation if an exculpatory conversation

10. See United States v. Cuellar, 96 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 1996); Olson, 978 F.2d
at 1482; United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987).
11. See United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 567 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing United
States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 716-17 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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takes place between the informer and a target who suspects an investigation is
underway. Therefore, do not automatically assume that awitness's willingness
to perform consensual monitoring should be pursued. If there is any possibility
that the subject of the investigation may suspect that an investigation has
begun, it usually is a poor idea to engage in consensual monitoring. The danger
of an exculpatory conversation is too great.
If undercover possibilities exist, every effort should be made to consider
the early introduction of an undercover law enforcement agent to the subject
of the investigation to permit the cooperating witness to withdraw from contact
with the target. This allows law enforcement, rather than the witness, to control
all aspects of the investigation.
Using a problem witness to record conversations can be dangerous. The
witness may alert the target, fabricate a target, or engineer tape recorder
"malfunctions" at critical moments of conversations. 2 For these reasons,
witnesses who are tape-recording conversations should be watched carefully
by the investigating agent and should not be permitted to record conversations
on their own.
Advise witnesses to let the target do the talking as much as possible and to
ask open-ended questions. Tapes in which the witness does most of the talking
and the subject responds in grunts will not persuade a jury that the subject is
orchestrating a criminal enterprise. Advise the witness to use the language of
the illegal activity (for example, say "dope" instead of "stuff').
Effective conversations can often be generated by taking actions that will
result in the subject becoming forceful and demanding. For example, if the
investigation involves bribery or extortion, the witness can be instructed to
offer less money than has been demanded or to pay it late, which might
motivate the subject to be more explicit in her demands than would be the case
if the transactions proceeded smoothly.
Continually remind the witness that she may not participate in any criminal
activity. Despite these warnings, many witnesses do continue to commit
crimes. Therefore, investigators must be continually vigilant.
IV. POLYGRAPHING THE PROBLEM WITNESS

Early in an investigation, many law enforcement agents consider
polygraphing an informant or cooperating witness. The United States

Department of Justice policy on polygraphs states in part:
[T]he Department recognizes that in certain situations, as in
testing the reliability of an informer, a polygraph can be of

some value. Department policy therefore supports the limited
use of the polygraph during investigations. This limited use

12. See United States v. Black, 776 F.2d 1321, 1323 (6th Cir. 1985).
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should be effectuated by using the trained examiners of the
federal investigative agencies, primarily the FBI, in
accordance with internal procedures formulated by the
agencies. The case agent or prosecutor should make clear to
the possible defendant or witness the limited purpose for
which results are used and that the test results will be only
one factor in making a prosecutive decision. If the subject is
in custody, the test should be preceded by Miranda warnings.
Subsequent admissions or confessions will then be admissible
if the trial3 court determines that the statements were
voluntary.'
If the results of the polygraph test prove the witness is deceptive, then this
fact must be disclosed to the defense because it constitutes Brady material. 4
Even though polygraph reports are generally inadmissible, statements to
polygraph examiners can constitute Brady material.$ The Supreme Court in
Wood v. Bartholomew'6 held that a state prosecutor's failure to disclose that a
witness had failed a polygraph test did not deprive the defendant of material
evidence under Brady absent a reasonable likelihood that disclosure would
have resulted in a different outcome at trial.' 7 Because it is possible in a
particular case that a defendant could establish that failure to disclose negative
polygraph results was material, the better practice is to disclose.'
Negative polygraph results, giving the prosecutor early knowledge that an
informant or cooperating witness is lying, may prevent the useless expenditure
of Government funds on an investigation. Of course if an informant or
cooperating witness passes a polygraph, then a good faith basis exists for
proceeding with the investigation.
V. GRAND JURY CONSIDERATIONS
Criminal witnesses are not generally motivated to cooperate for altruistic

reasons. Accordingly, they may be inclined to change their testimony at trial
if they have become disillusioned with the government. Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 801' grand jury testimony can be used as substantive evidence if the

13. U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE, U.S. ATroRNEYs' MANUAL § 9-13.300 (1997) (citations

omitted).
14. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
15. See Jacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1287-89 (11 th Cir. 1992); United States

v. Patino, 991 F. Supp. 1449, 1450-52 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
16. 516 U.S. 1 (1995).
17. Id. at8.
18. See United States v. Chandler, 950 F. Supp. 1522, 1533 (N.D. Ala. 1996)
(ordering an evidentiary hearing on the defendants' claim that failure to disclose polygraph
results warranted a new trial).
19. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
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witness changes his testimony at trial.2" For these reasons, consider putting the
problem witness in the grand jury before presenting the indictment.
VI. DISCUSSIONS WITH DEFENSE COUNSEL AT THE INVESTIGATIVE STAGE

When an investigation becomes overt and defense attorneys start calling,
take advantage of any opportunities to discuss the case with them and obtain
information about Government witnesses. Conversations with defense counsel
about problem witnesses may eliminate surprise at trial during the crossexamination of those cooperating witnesses and may give the prosecutor an
opportunity to prepare the witness to deflect defense attacks. Keep in mind that
the defendant will probably know more about informant and accomplice
witnesses than the Government.
VII.

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING
COOPERATING WITNESSES

THE

PLEA

AGREEMENTS

OF

Once a prosecutor has decided that a witness's testimony or cooperation
would be useful, he should memorialize all agreements with the witness in
writing. Always remember that the terms of the witness's agreement with the
Government are discoverable and subject to scrutiny in the courtroom.
Carefully review both the substance and the language of the plea agreement
with the jury's perspective in mind. There should be no unwritten side deals.
Also remember that all plea agreements must involve a faithful and honest
application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.2' The just application
of the Sentencing Guidelines ensures consistency in sentencing and adds
credibility to the Government's decision to use cooperating witnesses. The jury
will trust witnesses more if the Government is holding them accountable for
their crimes. A jury will distrust leniently treated witnesses and may believe
that their motivation to testify falsely is greater when the Government offers a
substantial sentencing departure in exchange for testimony.
Draft plea agreements with the assumption that the jury will read them.
Include language that requires the witness to tell the truth. Do not specify that
the witness is required to testify against a particular person. Such language
invites the defense to establish a motive for the witness to testify falsely against

20. See United States v. Odom, 13 F.3d 949, 954-55 (6th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39,46-47 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 1298, 1300-01
(7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jacoby, 955 F.2d 1527, 1539 (1Ith Cir. 1992); United States v.
Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 41 &n.6 (Ist Cir. 1991); United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1509 (10th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Bigham, 812 F.2d 943, 946 (Sth Cir. 1987); United States v. Wilson,
806 F.2d 171, 175-76 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Stockton, 788 F.2d 210, 219-20 &n.14
(4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983,998-99 (2d Cir. 1977); United States
v. Morgan, 555 F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1977).
21. For the Department's policies regarding plea agreements, see U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, supra note 13, §§ 9-27.330 to -27.450.
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the defendant. Likewise, the plea agreement should not make a downward
departure contingent on the outcome of any trial or grand jury proceeding.
The following is a list of considerations for plea agreements.
" Clearly and expressly state in the plea agreement all consideration
provided by the Government to a witness.
• Clearly state in the plea agreement that the ultimate sentencing
decision will be made by the court and not the prosecutor. Also,
make sure the plea agreement expressly states that the possibility
of a downward departure is not contingent on the outcome of any
trial or grand jury proceeding.
" Do not commit to a sentencing recommendation or to an
agreement to move for a downward departure based upon
substantial assistance under the sentencing guidelines,' until the
witness has fulfilled his agreement to cooperate fully.
* Carefully consider whether a polygraph requirement should be
made part of the plea agreement and consult your agency's policy
in this area.
• Draft the plea agreement broadly to require testimony on any
matter as requested by the Government. If appropriate the plea
agreement should address the question of cooperation with state
and local prosecutors and administrative agencies.
" Have a provision in the plea agreement stating that if the witness
engages in illegal conduct, the plea agreement will be declared
void, and the witness will be subject to prosecution for all
criminal activity, including perjury, making false statements, and
obstruction of justice.
If the Government recommends that a witness and his family members
consider a witness security program, then the plea agreement should clearly
state that the prosecutor does not possess the authority to approve the witness's
admission into the program. The plea agreement should also include a
provision regarding any agreements about the immigration status of the witness
or members of the witness's family.
VIII.

IMMUNITY

Complete immunity should be granted only when necessary. If the witness
committed a crime, she should usually be required to incur some criminal
liability as part of any plea agreement. 23
The lawyer for an immunized witness may contend that the witness needs

22. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 7, § 5Kl.1, at 356.
23. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 13, §§ 9-27.300 to -27.650.
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state immunity also. The Government should resist obtaining state immunity
because it will appear to the jury that the witness is receiving yet another gift
in exchange for her testimony.
Most important, state immunity is not necessary
24
to protect the witness.
Prosecutors must be cautious about offering immunity because the offer25
itself can be used against the government. In United States v. Biaggi
immunity was offered to a target in exchange for cooperation.26 The target
rejected the offer and was prosecuted.' At trial the defendant argued that his
rejection of the immunity offer was evidence of "consciousness of
innocence."2 The Second Circuit concluded that it was error for the district
court to exclude the evidence because the jury was "entitled to believe that
most people would jump at the chance to obtain an assurance of immunity from
prosecution and to infer from
rejection of the offer that the accused lacks
29
knowledge of wrongdoing.
IX. PRETRIAL PREPARATION

Identifying and producing exculpatory evidence, impeachment material,
and witness statements present a significant challenge to the Government when
informants or accomplices testify as Government witnesses. The prosecutor has
a significant burden to ensure that the Government discloses any such material
(commonly called Brady, Giglio, and Jencks material) to defense counsel and
that it makes a record of the disclosure. Do not underestimate the time it takes
to collect such material, particularly for a witness who has testified in many
different districts and has a relationship with several law enforcement agencies.
Use the following checklist to ensure that you obtain all necessary information
about the witness:
" PersonalBackground.True name; date of birth (DOB); all alias
names, alias DOBs, and circumstances surrounding their use; and
citizenship status.
• CriminalHistory.Records documenting federal, state, and foreign
convictions; records documenting prior arrests; and records
concerning pending charges, including outstanding warrants,

24. See United States v. Rose, 806 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding the
contempt conviction of a witness with a federal grant of use immunity who refused to testify
because the Oregon immunity statute offered transactional immunity); see also In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, No. 84-4, 757 F.2d 1580, 1582-83 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that state courts are
required to respect immunity granted under the federal immunity statute and that a witness
granted immunity under the federal statute need not fear state prosecution based on testimony
sought by the federal grand jury).
25. 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1990).
26. Id. at 690.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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pending investigations, and uncharged criminal conduct.
Informant'sPriorRelationshipwith LawEnforcement.As to each
agency with which the informant has worked, determine the
length of the relationship and what motivated the cooperation
(e.g., money, charging or sentencing benefit, immunity for prior
crimes, assistance with immigration status, protection, revenge,
excitement, or public spirit) and identify all controlling agents;
determine the nature and amount of all compensation and other
benefits received by the informant; and obtain all corroborating
documents. Also determine the following: (1) if the informant is
incarcerated, whether he received special privileges not normally
extended to prisoners; (2) whether the informant has, in fact,
received favorable treatment regarding his immigration status; (3)
whether any law enforcement agency has intervened on behalf of
the informant in any criminal prosecutions, arrests, citations, or
civil proceedings; (4) whether the informant is in the Witness
Security Program and what expenses were incurred with respect
to that status; and (5) whether the informant declared any
compensation received from the government (state or Federal) on
his income tax returns (or whether the informant filed them at all).
Evaluatethe Informant'sInvolvement in the Instant Case. Gather
information regarding the informant's role in the instant case,
including: (1) when and how the witness first met the
defendant(s); (2) the witness's relationship with each defendant
prior to and during the criminal activity (e.g., family, romantic,
friendship, business or financial, or past criminal relationship); (3)
the witness's role in the instant criminal activity (e.g., did the
informant initiate the activity, was he a peripheral participant or
central to the scheme, did the informant use weapons or engage
in violence); (4) the meetings in which the witness participated;
(5) whether the witness told agents about all the meetings and
conversations in which he participated; (6) if the witness was
arrested in the case, whether he made any post-arrest statements;
and (7) if so, obtain copies and evaluate these statements for
truthfulness.
PriorTestimony. Obtain copies of all prior sworn testimony given
by the informant witness, whether the testimony was given by
deposition, before a grand jury, in pre-trial proceedings, at trial,
or at a sentencing hearing. Talk to the prosecutors from other
cases in which the witness testified to determine what type of
witness he is and to learn of any problems encountered.
Problems with Alcohol, Drugs, or Mental Health. Ascertain
whether the witness has ever used drugs. Determine whether the
drug use corresponds with the events of the instant case. If the
witness is incarcerated, consider sending a "drug use" inquiry

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss3/11
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letter to the warden of the correctional facility. Determine whether
the witness has ever had any alcohol or mental health problems.
Finally, discover whether or not the witness has received any
treatment for any such problems and, if so, whether the treatment
was successful.
Compliance with Agency Guidelines Regarding Use of
Informants. Most, if not all, agencies are subject to official
guidelines for dealing with informants. Defense attorneys
frequently cross-examine agents and informants about
noncompliance with these guidelines. Become familiar with these
agency guidelines and make sure they were followed. If there
were specific instances of noncompliance, ascertain why and be

prepared to make a Brady-Giglio analysis to see if you must
disclose any materials to the court or defense.
X. PREPARING THE INFORMANT OR ACCOMPLICE WITNESS TO TESTIFY

Preparing the testimony of an informant or accomplice is time consuming.
Besides reviewing the substance of the testimony, remind the witness to tell the
truth. Do not say anything to a witness that you would not want a defense
attorney, ajudge, a reporter, or the jury to hear. Witnesses have been known to
tape their conversations with the prosecution team. Avoid becoming too
friendly with any witness-especially informants and accomplices. These
people are not the Government's friends, and it should not appear otherwise at
trial. By keeping the relationship professional, and somewhat distant, the
prosecutor and agents are less likely to overlook signs that the witness is not
cooperating fully.
XI. DEFENSE REQUESTS TO INTERVIEW A PROBLEM WITNESS

If the defense asks to interview the witness, the Government must instruct
the witness that she is free to submit to such an interview. Telling a witness not
to speak to a defense attorney is improper. However, telling a witness that she
is not required to speak to a defense attorney is permissible. 0
Sometimes an informer's identity must be revealed to the defense even if
the Government does not intend to use the informer as a witness. Whether an
informant's identity should be disclosed depends on the circumstances of each
case and requires a balancing of the public's right to the flow of information

30. See Workman v. Bell, 160 F.3d 276,288 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Davis,
154 F.3d 772, 785 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.denied, 119 S. Ct. 1090 (1999); United States v. Black,
767 F.2d 1334, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1985); Kines v. Butterworth, 669 F.2d 6, 10-11 (lst Cir. 1981);
United States v. Walton, 602 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Scott, 518
F.2d 261, 267-68 (6th Cir. 1975).
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3
against the requirements of providing a fair trial to the defendant. '

XII.

VoiR DIRE CONSIDERATIONS

During the voir dire of the jury, request the judge to inquire about the use
of cooperating defendants and immunized witnesses. Such an inquiry helps the
jury become comfortable with the idea of co-conspirator testimony and the fact
that the use of these witnesses is common.
XIII.

OPENING STATEMENT CONSIDERATIONS

In opening statements, it is tempting to overstate the nature of the
testimony expected from a cooperating witness. Because these witnesses often
do not perform as persuasively as expected, the better practice is to understate
such a witness's expected testimony. Tell the jury that physical and testimonial
evidence corroborates the testimony of the cooperating witness. This allows the
jurors to trust the testimony before they hear it. The distasteful aspects of the
witness's background and involvement in criminal activity should be disclosed
to the jury during the opening statement, including the nature of any plea
agreement or immunity order.
It is also important to assure the jury that plea agreements and immunity
orders are commonplace and lawful (i.e., "You will learn that, as provided for
under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the witness entered into an agreement
with the Government. .. ").
XIV.

DiREcT EXAMINATION CONSIDERATIONS

Consider starting the direct examination with facts that have already been
corroborated or will soon be corroborated by other witnesses. Instead ofrelying
on records custodians, ask the witness to identify bank records, toll records,
receipts, photographs, and objects seized in searches as he testifies about the
events to which they relate. The witness can also authenticate tapes from
wiretaps or consensual monitoring. These identifications provide instant
corroboration for the testimony. After establishing credibility in this way,
weave the negative material (e.g., plea agreement or criminal history) into the
middle of the direct examination.
Caution must be exercised in eliciting testimony on direct examination
concerning witness relocation expenses paid by the Government. Defense
counsel may argue that such evidence improperly suggests the defendant was
dangerous or likely to retaliate against the witness.3" The Government has a

31. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 58-62 (1957).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 1002-03 (6th Cir. 1999).
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clear obligation to disclose these payments to the defense,3 but the cautious
prosecutor should consider obtaining an advance ruling by the court before
questioning a witness about relocation payments.34
Consider limiting the scope of direct examination with an immunized
witness to limit the scope of the immunity. For the same reason, object to crossexamination beyond the scope of direct. Argue to the judge that the
Government did not intend to offer immunity to matters beyond the scope of
direct examination.
On direct examination an issue may arise regarding the admissibility of a
cooperating co-conspirator's plea agreement. While a plea agreement cannot
be used as evidence of a defendant's guilt, it may be used for a proper
purpose.3" For example, the prosecutor may be able to use a co-conspirator's
plea agreement to rebut the argument that a defendant has been improperly
selected for prosecution.36 Similarly, a plea agreement may be admissible to
corroborate the testimony of the cooperating co-defendant.37
Defense counsel may argue about the admissibility of specific language in
a plea agreement. A good example is the admissibility of plea agreement
language relating to the defendant's agreement to submit to a polygraph
examination or language that requires the cooperating defendant to provide
"truthful testimony." The defense often argues that this language unfairly
bolsters the credibility of the cooperating witness.38 This argument is not
insignificant as the First Circuit has stated: "A defendant may be denied a fair
trial if the prosecution portrays itself 'as a guarantor oftruthfalness' by making
personal assurances that the witness is telling the truth or by implicitly
vouching for the witness by indicating that information not heard as evidence
supports the testimony.'

In the Second Circuit, pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the
"Edwards Rule," the Government can risk impeaching its own witness by
introducing the plea agreement on direct examination, but it may not introduce
portions of the plea agreement that could bolster the credibility of the witness

33. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (extending Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), to encompass evidence regarding a government witness's
credibility).
34. See Talley, 164 F.3d at 1003 (denying mistrial when prosecutor made limited
inquiry about relocation payments, court gave limiting instruction, and defense counsel inquired
extensively about witness protection program).
35. See United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing United States
v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1363 (3d Cir. 1991)); United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158,
162-63 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, 378 (5th Cir. 1985)).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Inadi, 790 F.2d 383, 384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986).
37. See Gaev, 24 F.3d at 476.
38. See, e.g., Townsend, 796 F.2d at 162-63.
39. United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 344-45 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting United
States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1987)).
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unless the defense has attacked it.4" The Second Circuit noted that it has been
difficult to distinguish the impeachment attributes of a plea agreement from its
bolstering provisions, admitting that if it were addressing the issues anew it
might not follow the Edwards rule.4'
Nine circuits have rejected Edwards and instead permit the Government
to introduce the entire plea agreement of a cooperating co-defendant witness. 42
These cases reason that cooperation agreements provide no special incentive
to testify truthfully and do nothing to enhance the Government's ability to
determine if the witness is lying; thus, nothing in the plea agreement implies
the Government has any special knowledge of the witness's veracity. However,
when the prosecutor says in opening statement that if the witness testifies
truthfully "it's my intent to ... recommend a 15 year sentence... ,43 the
prosecutor is improperly leading the jury to believe she "ha[s] a special ability
or extraneous knowledge to assess credibility, [and] the statement[] [is]
improper." 44 It is also improper on direct examination to elicit testimony
regarding plea negotiations with the witness where it is clear that the plea
agreement materialized only after the prosecutor was personally satisfied the
witness was telling the truth.45
Note that if the defense has attacked the credibility of a witness for the
Government in opening statement, the promise to testify truthfully may be
40. See United States v. Edwards, 631 F.2d 1049, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1980); see also
United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493,497-98 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding harmless error where
prosecutor questioned witnesses regarding provisions ofcooperation agreements on direct exam
in response to defense counsel's challenging credibility ofwitness in opening argument), vacated
on other grounds, 955 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 46, 56-58 (2d
Cir. 1985) (finding reversible error for trial court to have admitted full cooperation agreement
into evidence in absence of prior attack on witness's credibility).
41. See United States v. Cosentino, 844 F.2d 30,33 n.1 (2d Cir. 1988). The Edwards
rule has been followed in the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits; see, e.g., United States v. Knowles,
66 F.3d 1146, 1161 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Perez, 67 F.3d 1371, 1379-80 (9th Cir.
1995), modified, 116 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Delgado, 56 F.3d 1357, 1368
(11 th Cir. 1995); United States v. Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007,1013-14 (9th Cir. 1991); United States
v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1479-80 (11th Cir. 1986).
42. See United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359,369 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 1032 (1999); United States v. Lewis, 110 F.3d 417,421 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Willis, 997 F.2d 407,414 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320,324 (D.C. Cir.
1993); United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 215 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Lord, 907
F.2d 1028, 1030-31 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 12 (8th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Edelman, 873 F.2d 791,795 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Walker, 871 F.2d
1298, 1303 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 898-900 (7th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d
135, 137-38 (4th Cir. 1983); see also United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (3d Cir.
1984) (stating entire plea agreement admissible at least where Government could anticipate later
effort to impeach witness), vacated on othergroundssub nona., United States v. Pflaumer, 473
U.S. 922 (1985).
43. United States v. Francis, Nos. 97-1129,97-1130, 1999 WL 95039, at * 4 (6th Cir.
Feb. 25, 1999).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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admissible on direct examination of the witness to rebut such an attack."
Any claim of prejudice made by the defendant as a consequence of
admitting a co-conspirator's plea agreement may be cured by requesting the
court to issue a limiting instruction, such as the following:
I caution you that although you may consider this evidence in
assessing the credibility and testimony of this witness, giving
it such weight as you feel it deserves, you may not consider
this evidence against the defendant on trial, nor may any
inference be drawn against him by reason of this witness'[s]
plea. 7
When a defendant introduces evidence ofa witness's plea agreement, however,
there is no prejudice, and no limiting instruction is required.48
XV.

CROSS-EXAMINATION CONSIDERATIONS

Prepare cooperating witnesses for cross-examination by advising them that
all questions must be answered truthfully, and that they are not testifying to
promote a particular outcome in the case. Consider conducting a mock crossexamination of each cooperating witness. Make sure cooperating witnesses
understand the plea agreement and are prepared to respond to questions about
their motives for testifying. Remind these witnesses that there is nothing wrong
with pretrial interviews and that they should testify truthfully about the number
and nature of pretrial meetings with prosecutors and law enforcement agents.
At trial resist the urge to object to questions on cross-examination unless
absolutely necessary. Many witnesses handle themselves better on cross than

46. See, e.g., Delgado, 56 F.3d at 1368; United States v. Gaind, 31 F.3d 73, 78;
Monroe, 943 F.2d at 1013-14.
47. United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 475 (3d. Cir. 1994); see also United States
v. Prawl, No. 98-1259, 1999 WL 79653, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1999) ("A limiting instruction
is justified when evidence-such as the guilty plea of a testifying co-defendant-is admissible
for a limited purpose but might also be considered for a purpose that is impermissible."); United
States v. Universal Rehabilitation Services (PA), Inc., Nos. 97-1412,-1413,-1414,-1467,-1468,
1999 WL 62512, at * 10 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 1999) (stating that alimiting instruction against the use
of the plea as substantive evidence of defendant's guilt will reduce the prejudice that injures the
defendant by admission of co-conspirator's guilty plea); United States v. Pennington, Nos. 972847, -2888, -3152, 1999 WL 50158, at *5 (8th Cir. Feb. 5, 1999) (concluding that allowing a
witness to testify that he had pled guilty to mail fraud based on his participation in fraudulent
scheme was not abuse of discretion because the court gave limiting instruction that witness's
plea could not be used against defendant); United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1003-04
(6th Cir. 1998) (concluding that when evidence ofa witness pleading guilty is admitted, the party
against whom the evidence is offered is entitled to a limiting instruction); United States v.
Thomas, 998 F.2d 1202, 1206 (3d Cir. 1993) ("In several cases where evidence of a coconspirator's guilty plea was entered, we have held that proper limiting instructions from the
court cured the possible prejudice to the defendant.").
48. See United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 524 (9th Cir. 1998).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

15

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 11
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 50: 679

on direct. In addition the Government should not appear to be keeping
information from the jury.
Before trial consider filing motions in limineto limit the cross-examination
of the cooperating witnesses. The Sixth Amendment "guarantees only 'an
opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish."' 49
"The [S]ixth [A]mendment requires that a defendant be granted an opportunity
to explore criminal charges against aprosecution witness on cross-examination
in order to bring the witness'[s] possible motive or self-interest to the jury's
attention."5 °
The opportunity to cross-examine is not unlimited."1 The court may impose
limits on cross-examination as long as the court grants the defendant sufficient
leeway to establish "a reasonably complete picture of the witness'[s] veracity,
bias, and motivation."52
The general rule for drug informants is that cross-examination on payments
received from the Government must be permitted to extend not only to her
work in the case on trial, but also to previous work for the government. 3 In
some instances it may be possible to limit cross-examination on payments
received in connection with other investigations. 4 If the witness has received
payments inconnection with ongoing investigations, a trial judge may refuse
to allow cross-examination that might jeopardize such investigations. 5 In
addition it may be possible to limit cross-examination of an informant on drug
use to a particular time period.5 6 A trial judge may refuse to allow disclosure

49. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739 (1987) (emphasis omitted) (quoting
Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (per curiam)).
50. United States v. Machado, 804 F.2d 1537, 1545 (11 th Cir. 1986).
51. See United States v. Devin, 918 F.2d 280,292-93 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding it was
within the trial judge's discretion to preclude cross-examination of an informant on the identity
of two other subjects of a public corruption investigation when there had been extensive crossexamination of the witness on payments made to other public officials who were shielded by
immunity).
52. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 254 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the trial
judge's denial of cross-examination on witnesses' procurement of male prostitutes and on
witnesses' sexual orientation was not reversible error where defense pursued vigorous crossexamination on grant of immunity and other crimes committed by witnesses); see also United
States v.Smith, 145 F.3d 458, 462-63 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that the defendant was able to
provide a reasonably complete picture of the witnesses during cross-examination without
questioning them about their knowledge of the defendant's prior acquittal), cert. denied, 119 S.
Ct. 383 (1998).
53. United States v. Salsedo, 607 F.2d 318,321 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Leja,
568 F.2d 493,499 (6th Cir. 1977) (reversing conviction for district court's failure to allow crossexamination on informer's total compensation package).
54. United States v. Elorduy, 612 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir. 1980).
55. United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 494,499-500 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in not allowing defendant to cross-examine an informant about
illegal activity and payments in another case in such detail that it would induce informant to
invoke the Fifth Amendment and would jeopardize ongoing investigations).
56. United States v. Broadus, 7 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 1993).
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of the address and place of employment of a witness if the value of the
evidence is outweighed by danger to the witness.57
Cross-examination on the plea agreement and on the criminal history of the
witness can also be confined. Where the defendant is permitted to conduct
sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment, the scope of any further cross-examination falls within the
discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling will not be disturbed
absent an abuse of discretion. 8 It is not an abuse of discretion to limit crossexamination of a Government witness concerning past convictions to the facts
of those convictions, rather than allowing defense counsel to explore the
underlying details.5 9 When the jury is fully aware of the plea agreement,
limiting cross-examination on the nature of the probationary sentence does not
deprive a defendant of a fair trial.'

XVI.

HANDLING CREDIBILITY AND BIAS ISSUES

Federal Rule of Evidence 60861 provides that, for the purpose of attacking
or supporting the witness's credibility, specific instances of misconduct cannot
be proven by extrinsic evidence, other than conviction of a crime as provided
in Rule 609 (impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime).62 However,
defense counsel may cross-examine on specific instances of misconduct by a
cooperating witness if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. 6
Defense counsel may offer extrinsic evidence of misconduct on the theory
that it directly contradicts the testimony of a cooperating witness. A common
example arises when a Government witness denies drug use on crossexamination, and defense counsel, in an effort to attack credibility, offers a
witness who is prepared to testify the Government witness used drugs. Under
Rule 608,6 prohibiting a party from introducing extrinsic evidence to prove
specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or
supporting his credibility, the court should not admit the evidence.6 5
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not address the issue, prior
misconduct of a witness which is probative of bias may be proven by extrinsic

57. See United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Watson, 599 F.2d 1149,1157 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding trial court's limit on cross-examination
to protect witness's secret identity).

58. United States v. Tolliver, 665 F.2d 1005, 1008 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Alford v.
United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931)).
59. See United States v. Castro, 788 F.2d 1240, 1246 (7th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1424 (1lth Cir. 1991) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion
in precluding cross-examination on underlying facts of pending charges against the witness).
60. United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 929-30 (6th Cir. 1986).
61. FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
62. Id. 609.
63. Id. 608(b).
64. Id.
65. United States v. Phillips, 888 F.2d 38,41-42 (6th Cir. 1989).
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evidence.66 But even when offered to show bias, the trial judge has discretion
to exclude extrinsic evidence that is "only remotely relevant."'67
XVII.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION CONSIDERATIONS

On redirect examination be prepared to use prior consistent statements
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 "to rebut an express or implied charge
against [the declarant] of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive"
in the testimony.6" This can be a good way of highlighting the important aspects
of the testimony-list all of the evidence the witness supplied to law
enforcement when first interviewed and before a plea agreement was reached.
Redirect examination is also a good time to highlight that the plea agreement
contains adverse consequences if the witness commits perjury. Just remember
the restrictions that apply regarding improper bolstering as discussed above.
XVIII. FINAL ARGUMENT CONSIDERATIONS
In closing argument, stress evidence showing that the witness, however
repugnant she may be, is telling the truth. As in opening statement and direct
examination, use charts to show how other evidence corroborates the testimony
of the witness. Acknowledge the distasteful background of the witnesses, thus
validating the jurors' feelings about them. Argue that the defendant picked the
witnesses, not the Government (i.e., "The defendant picked John Doe as a
witness when he approached him with an opportunity to launder drug
money."). Remind the jury that people do not confide their criminal plans in
people who are honest, law-abiding citizens.
Another effective way of rebutting a defense contention that an informant
or a cooperating co-defendant witness lied in exchange for a lenient sentence
is to argue that the witness would have behaved differently if she was inclined
to curry favor with the Government. Support this argument by identifying the
areas where the witness could have exaggerated or embellished, but did not.
Likewise, remind the jury about the times when the witness admitted a lack of
knowledge or a failure of memory.
If there are several cooperating co-defendants, point out their inability to
have contrived consistent testimony. Remind the jury that the defendant is on
trial, not the witnesses and quote the jury instruction on this point. 69
During final argument be careful when referring to that portion of a plea
agreement which requires that the witness provide "truthful testimony." This
can be improper vouching. A prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of
66. See United States v. Meyer, 803 F.2d 246, 249 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding extrinsic
evidence of misconduct is admissible if it "relates to beliefs of the witness or to preexisting
relationships" probative of bias).
67. United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1010 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S.Ct. 1126 (1999).
68. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(B).
69. See, e.g., I DEvrr ETAL.,supra note 4, § 12.11, at 372-73.
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a Government witness by: (1) placing the prestige of the government behind
the witness, or (2) indicating that information not presented to the jury supports
the witness's testimony. In United States v. Young 7" defense counsel called the
Government's key witnesses "perjurers" in his closing argument.7' The
prosecutor then vouched for the credibility of the witnesses by telling the jury
that the Government thought the witnesses testified truthfully.72 The Supreme
Court found that the prosecutor's remarks were improper, but upheld the
conviction based upon the invited response doctrine." However, the Court
cautioned that the invited response doctrine should not be read as condoning
responses in kind.74
75
It may be reversible error for a prosecutor to call a witness "honest.
Likewise, it may be improper for the Government to argue that "the
Government has done as much as [it] can do to [e]nsure [the] credibility [of]
a witness.
XIX.

76

CONCLUSION

It is a rare federal criminal trial that does not require the use of criminal
witnesses-those who have pleaded guilty to an offense and are testifying
under a plea agreement, or those who are testifying under a grant of immunity.
These witnesses can be an effective component of the Government's proof if
the prosecutor exercises great care in supervising the witness during the
investigative phase, in corroborating the testimony, in preparing the witness for
trial, in educating the jury that use of these witnesses is common and proper,
and by limiting damaging cross-examination.
The relationship between government representatives and informants is
best kept distant and professional. No other area of practice presents more
ethical challenges forprosecutors. Consequently, aprosecutorusing these types
of witnesses must have a sound working knowledge of the ethical rules for
disclosure of exculpatory evidence underBradyv. Maryland77 and its progeny.

70. 470 U.S. 1 (1985).

71. Id. at 11.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 12-13.
74. Id. at 13.
75. United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1353 (6th Cir. 1993).
76. United States v. Hurst, 951 F.2d 1490, 1502 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United
States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding it was improper for the prosecution
to argue "that the [G]overnment had taken 'great pains' to keep [two Government witnesses]
apart so the jury could trust them" and thus implying that the Government had "taken steps to
assure the veracity of its witnesses"); United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530,533 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding it was error for the prosecutor to state that a police officer was in court to monitor the
testimony of the witness and make sure he complied with the plea agreement). It is not vouching
to argue that a witness is speaking the truth because he has reason to do so. United States v.
Dockray, 943 F.2d 152, 156 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that informing the jury of the effect of the
plea agreement on a witness's incentive to testify is not improper vouching).
77. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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